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This article addresses the common concern that Emmanuel Levinas’
ethics amounts to a life-denying, moral masochism. To the contrary, I
demonstrate close resonances between Levinas’ project and that of the
psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, for whom the purpose of therapy is to
feel alive. In the first section, I trace the Levinasian subject’s coming
to be out of the impersonal Il y a. Exploiting the object-relations
undertones, I emphasize that the Levinasian subject comes to be as
fastened, riveted, or bound to existence, and thereafter seeks to loosen
its bond to its existence. In the second section, I discuss Winnicott’s own
account of the subject’s coming to be: a movement from unintegration
to integration. In the third section, I discuss Winnicott’s treatment of
schizoid patients, and I propose that the schizoid patient’s refusal of alive
subjectivity in Winnicott’s sense is equally a refusal of ethical subjection
in Levinas’s sense. I analyze the schizoid false self as a retreat from an
original vulnerability to the other that is constitutive of the alive subject.
Hence, schizoid phenomena can be understood as defenses organized
against alive subjectivity as well as ethical subjection in Levinas’ sense.
I argue that healing for Winnicott entails a breakdown of the ego –
akin to Levinas’s notion of substitution – which births a new subject.
Far from presenting Levinas’s ethics as life-denying or masochistic, this
paper affirms the intimate intertwinement of ethical responsibility and
affective responsivity in Levinas’ thought.
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Reading the works of Emmanuel Levinas, it
is not long before one gets the impression
that he sets ethics against life – my life in particular. Consider, for instance, what he writes
in a paper entitled “Bad Conscience and the
Inexorable”:
My ‘in the world,’ 1 my ‘place in the sun,’
my at homeness, have they not been
the usurpation of the places belonging
to the other man already oppressed
and starved by me? Fear of all that my
existing, despite its intentional and
conscious innocence, can accomplish of
violence and murder. (Levinas, 1986, p. 38)
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It is as though by soaking up life – by warming my skin in the sun – I have already accomplished violence, even murder. Quotations
like this one have led some authors to raise
the concern that Levinas presents us with
a severe or even masochistic ethics (Rizzolo,
2017; Bernasconi, 2002). For, if my very being
in the world usurps a place that could belong
to the other, this suggests an ethical relation
in which I am called to give up my life for
the other.
But such a formula, in which we are to
simply substitute the other for the self, does
not do justice to the complexity of Levinas’

Levinas is referring to Pascal, whose Pensées he cites a few years later in the epigraph to Otherwise than
Being (1998): ‘“…That is my place in the sun.’ That is how the usurpation of the whole world began.”
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position. Although my at homeness usurps
the place of the other, it also seems to be the
case that, according to Levinas, to refuse to
take up my place in the sun is also to refuse
the ethical relation; after all, I must be at
home to answer the door. Otherwise said,
the calling into question of my life presupposes that I have a life to call into question.
If Levinas’ ethics were against life – an anesthetic ethics – this would be an ethics for the
inhuman: the undead or living-dead. This
would be no ethics at all.
What I see as Levinas’ adamant stance
against an anesthetic, undead ethics is where I
see a similarity between his project and that of
the object-relations analyst, D.W. Winnicott,
for whom the purpose of therapy is to feel
alive. Throughout his extensive clinical work,
Winnicott conceptualized a category of
patients trapped in an undead or living-dead
quasi-existence. These patients, whom he
diagnosed as schizoid, often complained that
they have not yet been born, not yet taken up
their place in the sun, and – as I will show –
have therefore not yet asked themselves the
crucial question of ethics: “Have I the right
to be, am I worthy of being?” (Levinas, 1999,
p. 165). In this essay, I will read Levinas alongside Winnicott to address this not-yet subject
who does not raise this question, and who has
in this sense fallen away from the ethical relation, just as they have fallen away from life.
Several authors have already turned to
Levinas to conceptualize psychopathology as
a barrier to the ethical relation. Paul Marcus
(2007), for instance, writes that we can best
understand the analysand’s psychopathology
in terms of their being “ethically disabled”
(p. 519). According to Marcus, at the root
of suffering is selfish or narcissistic living;
psychopathology emanates from “the selfish
self undermining, if not usurping, the ethical
self” (p. 520). Similarly, Richard N. Williams
(2007) writes of enjoyment in Levinas as a
“mundane neediness and superficiality” that
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must be transcended to get to the ethical
relation (p. 694). I believe these characterizations are misleading for two reasons. First,
one of Levinas’ interesting gestures is to
present us with a narcissism that, far from
pathological, is the very picture of the vital,
healthy ego throbbing with enjoyment of life.
Second, it is precisely this separated, pulsating ego which enters into the ethical relation,
and in this sense there can be no ethical relation without this pulsating ego. In turning
to schizoid phenomena, we shall examine
those patients who are just as unable to participate in selfish, egoic enjoyment as much
as they may feel unable to participate in the
ethical relation. Schizoid phenomena can
be understood as defenses organized against
alive subjectivity as well as ethical subjection
in Levinas’ sense. This double falling away
– from life and the ethical relation – lends
support to what Levinas maintains: (ethical)
responsibility and (affective) responsivity are
intertwined, and there is no final separation
of the sensibility of egoism from the ethical
relation. The animated ego is a prerequisite
for ethics; yet ethics, in its turn, is an animating relation.
If ethics is animating, then it would be
fruitful to investigate, as psychoanalysis does,
the various ways in which life gets shortcircuited, dammed-up, anesthetized, and
deadened. Following this approach, Simone
Drichel (2019) takes Levinas to be offering us
an ethics that demands our relational vulnerability. She argues that psychopathological
organizations like masochism or narcissism
defend precisely against such a relational
vulnerability, rendering the subject ethically
impaired (p. 3) Drichel argues that relational
vulnerability of the sort Levinas championed is the kind of vulnerability Winnicott
(2018) tried to help his patients to recover:
“If we are successful we enable the patient to
abandon invulnerability and to become a sufferer”: to become a sufferer, which is to say, to
become alive (p. 199).
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In their own ways, both Levinas and
Winnicott trace the subject’s emergence into
life. For Levinas, the starting point is the Il
y a: the strange irremissibility of impersonal
being from which the subject emerges.2
As I will discuss later on, I believe it is no
coincidence that Levinas (1985) looked to
his own childhood as he reflected upon this
enigmatic philosophical concept. Levinas’ Il
y a can be investigated alongside Winnicott’s
own account of development, whereby the
absolute dependence whence each of us came
inaugurates a journey toward dependence,
and still later toward independence (p. 6).
It is true that Levinas does not stop where
Winnicott does. Fred Alford (2000) rightly
points out the obvious disjunction between
Winnicott’s ideal subject: autonomous, spontaneous, creative, authentic, as compared to
Levinas’ (1969) ethical project, as it is rather
directly defined in Totality and Infinity: “We
name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics”
(p. 43). Yet, both these thinkers conceive a
subject who emerges from some original relationship with an exterior other, an original
relationship that can make us tremble, but
whose heteronomy binds us for good. There
is a radical openness or unboundedness to the
Il y a, as well as a breaking down of the ego’s
self-enclosed, narcissistic structure, opened
to “being in no way private” that makes the
Il y a an ethical term in Levinas’ work. The Il
y a¸ thus, marks not only a breakdown of the

ego but a breaking open to exteriority, or as
Rudi Visker (2004) puts it, to a “trauma which
heals” (p. 84). In a similar fashion, I argue that
healing for Winnicott entails a breakdown
of the ego, a passage through madness that
is feared above all, and which births a new
subject.3
The outline of this paper is as follows:
In the first section, I trace the Levinasian
subject’s coming to be out of the impersonal Il y a. Exploiting the object-relations
undertones, I emphasize that the Levinasian
subject comes to be as fastened, riveted, or
bound to existence, and thereafter seeks to
loosen this bond to existence. In the second
section, I discuss Winnicott’s own account
of the subject’s coming to be: a movement
from unintegration to integration. In the
third section, I discuss Winnicott’s treatment
of schizoid patients, and I propose that the
schizoid patient’s refusal of alive subjectivity
in Winnicott’s sense is equally a refusal of ethical subjection in Levinas’ sense. I analyze the
schizoid false self as a retreat from an original
vulnerability to the other that is constitutive
of the alive subject. Finally, I offer that healing can take place only through a breakdown
of the false ego, an ultimate leap into the void
wherein the patient cannot be sure she will
find the other’s hold. I conclude by offering
some implications for clinical work.

2

For more on the Il y a as an apposite point of contact between Levinas’ philosophy and psychoanalysis,
see Rudi Visker (2004): “One understands why Levinas turns his back on psychoanalysis: not because he
did not wish to acknowledge it, but, to the contrary, precisely because he had indeed recognized it. The
place of psychoanalysis – this the place of the il y a” (p. 106).

3

I am aware that there is a risk of a “confusion of tongues” ahead of us (Drichel, 2019). I am likely to slip
between the ethical and the ontological, even though Levinas’ project has been summarized in the claim
that ethics precedes ontology. In turning to Winnicott, I will undoubtedly be brushing off some philosophical distinctions, as Winnicott no doubt did as he prioritized the clinical over the theoretical. In any
case, I appreciate Simon Critchley’s (1999) remark: “It is only by reading against Levinas’s denials and
resistances that we might get some insight into what is going on in his text: its latencies, its possibilities,
its radicalities” (p. 232). I will leave holes for the reader to burrow through, filling them in as she sees fit or
else crawling through them toward new caverns to explore (Visker, 2004, p. 79-81).
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From Existence to Existent
Levinas introduces us to the Il y a – the
strange irremissibility of impersonal being –
in his early philosophical work, Existence and
existents, which he wrote as a prisoner of war.
In this section, I provide some philosophical
background to the Il y a, though by no means
can I do justice to the complexities tied to
this notoriously obscure term. Instead, I
address the Il y a insofar as it can help us to
read Levinas as a developmental thinker. In
fact, the French title, De l’existence a l’existent,
translates to the English “from existence to
existent.” This literal translation better captures Levinas’ project in this work: to trace
how the individual existent arises from and
stakes a solitary, separated position within
impersonal existence.
To situate his project, it is helpful to
understand that Levinas’ main interlocutor
in this work is Martin Heidegger. In Being
and time, Heidegger (2010) argues that we are
anxious at the deepest level of our being, and
this anxiety is fundamentally about our ownmost possibility of our impossibility: that is
to say, our death. In Existence and existents,
Levinas (2001) inverses this anxiety: “Is not
anxiety over Being – horror of Being – just as
primal as anxiety over death?” (p. 5) 4 To further invoke our curiosity, he asks us to imagine the disappearance of the world. What
remains? Something, Levinas affirms, since
existence is antecedent to the world: the bare
fact that there is (Il y a) (p. 8). Here it is the
plenitude of being rather than nothingness
that is so horrifying.
It is against this horrifying background
of impersonal existence that the existent
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emerges. By surging out of impersonal existence, which has no beginning or end, the
existent makes a contract with existence,
and this event constitutes the present
(p. 25). Levinas names this event – the contract that the existent makes with existence
– the hypostasis. Contract here has the double
sense of a contraction of existence, a contraction of identity, and a binding contract that
cannot be revoked. An individual existent
has already taken up the burden of its own
existence, and this is an accomplishment, not
a given (p. 1). This adherence to existence is
not taken lightly, and for Levinas (2003; 2001)
experiences such as nausea, fatigue, and pain
are each harsh reminders of this irrevocable
commitment to being. Existing, then, is an
activity; it is to take up the work of existence
(p. 25). Hence the reflexive: “it is not just that
one is, one is oneself (on s’est)” (2001, p. 16).
Though stuck in this irrevocable contract, the existent is motivated to escape
its existence, or at least to loosen its sticky
adherence to existence. Escape is sought outside oneself (Levinas, 1987, p. 63). The aim is to
transcend to the world through its need for
nourishments, effectively deferring the fall
back on ourselves (p. 3). Thanks to my neediness, my dependence on that from which
I live, I am not anonymous, but a solitary,
pulsating ego. As Levinas (1969) affirms in
Totality and infinity, “The human being thrives
on his needs; he is happy for his needs” (p.
114). Enjoyment is alimentation; I have an
appetite for life. In this movement toward
the world, consciousness is “sincere”, which is
to say that it has no ulterior motives but these
nourishments themselves (p. 31). Otherwise
put, “[S]ensibility is the very narrowness
of life” (p. 138). Enjoyment, sensibility, the

Levinas (1987) continues this critique in Time and the Other: "Anxiety, according to Heidegger, is the
experience of nothingness. Is it not, on the contrary - if by death one means nothingness - the fact that it
is impossible to die?" (p. 51)
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egoism of life: this is the pulsation of the “I” in
its happy dependency, but a dependency that
turns into sovereignty, since I live in naïve,
egoist ignorance of my dependency, “entirely
deaf to the Other” (p. 134).
These nourishments allow us a detour
before the eventual return to the self. The
goal of this movement by which the self
transcends itself (though inevitably returns
to itself) is ultimately to be transformed by
this movement (Visker, 2004, p. 210). The goal is
to prevent oneself “from falling back upon a
point that is always the same” (Levinas, 1987, p.
66). Worldly enjoyments help us to loosen the
leash – loosen the bond with oneself. At the
end of the day, however, enjoyments alone do
not cut it; they do not succeed in severing the
self from its existence. This is why Levinas
describes the satisfaction of need as an assimilative movement; what is other becomes me
when I sink my teeth into it (Levinas, 1969, p.
129). At the end of a cigarette, I must light
a new one or else again find that I am still
in my own company (Visker, 2004). Worldly
enjoyments are not a final liberation. An
ethical relation is needed.

From Absolute Dependence to Ego
Integration
How does the infant come to take its
place under the sun? I would like to leave
Levinas for the moment and turn to
Winnicott’s conception of the subject. Like
Levinas, Winnicott speaks of existing as an
accomplishment rather than a given. For
Winnicott, the capacity to exist as a solitary
subject depends upon certain environmental
provisions. Such environmental provisions
are repeated throughout Winnicott’s oeuvre,
and have been widely popularized by notions
such as the “good enough mother” and the
holding space opened up between the infant
and mother (Winnicott, 1991). Here I would
like to turn to the early, pre-oedipal period
of infant development, during which time

the infant faces the challenge of becoming a
separate, integrated existent.
According to Winnicott, integration
is achieved out of a primary unintegrated
state; in this unintegrated state the infant
has no awareness of its absolute dependence
(Winnicott, 2006, p. 7; Winnicott, 1988, p.116). The
“good enough” environment permits the
infant to go on being without having to think
of its dependence, since in the beginning the
mother provides a near complete adaptation
to the infant’s needs (Winnicott, 2005, p. 13). As
development proceeds, she gradually adapts
less and less completely to the infant’s needs
at a rate that is sensitive to the infant’s growing ability to tolerate these failures and growing need for independence (p. 14). In this way,
the goal is to gradually disillusion the infant
of its sense of omnipotence (p. 15). However –
and this is crucial – at the beginning illusion
must be granted. More precisely, the mother
provides the infant with the illusion that
external reality corresponds to the infant’s
own capacity to create – to summon precisely
what it needs (p. 16). This is a paradox: “a baby
creates an object but the object would not
have been created as such if it had not already
been there” (p. 95). The object was, as it were,
there waiting to be created (1988, p. 119). Of
this creativity, which I believe is broad and
basic enough to be likened to Levinas’ notion
of sensibility, Winnicott (2005) writes:
It is present as much in the momentby-moment living of a backward child
who is enjoying breathing as it is in the
inspiration of an architect who suddenly knows what it is that he wishes to
construct, and who is thinking in terms
of material that can actually be used so
that his creative impulse may take form
and shape, and the world may witness.
(pp. 92-93)

What is actually created is of little importance. The point is that creativity belongs
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to being alive; it is real, naïve enjoyment
(Winnicott, 2005, p. 91). In fact, to live from this
creative self may be nothing more than sensory-motor aliveness (Winnicott, 1965, p. 148).
This is a primary creativity, but it is
only primary from the infant’s perspective,
because as we have seen the creative potential
is first given by the mother. For this reason,
the paradox of the illusion relates to the paradox of the mother’s identification. The mother’s identification can be called a paradox
because it does not smother or collapse the
infant into the mother’s ego but, with humility, leaves room for a separate life to flourish:
It is because of this identification with
her infant that she knows how to hold
her infant, so that the infant starts by
existing and not by reacting. Here is the
origin of the True Self which cannot
become a reality without the mother’s
specialized relationship, one which
might be described by a common word:
devotion (Winnicott, 1965, p. 148).
Speaking of creation, it is worth mentioning that this image of the mother resonates
with Levinas’ God, as presented by Visker
(2004): “The absoluteness of God […] lies in
the humility with which God withdraws,
not wishing to intrude on or prove himself
to the one he has created” (p. 107). By way of
contrast, we could think of the mother who
treats her child as a narcissistic extension,
thereby not permitting the infant enough
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room to breathe, not preserving the distance between herself and her creation. For
Winnicott, real life is a gift of humility, the
humility of maternity, of the mother who
takes my face as hers, but paradoxically, still
mine. This evocative picture resounds with
Levinas when he brings together maternity,
animation, passivity, and sensibility in one of
his typical brimming sentences: “Animation
can be understood as an exposure to the
other, the passivity of the for-the-other in
vulnerability, which refers to maternity,
which sensibility signifies” (Levinas, 1998, p.
71). That animation is rooted in an exposure
to the other can be readily observed in the
exposure of the infant – naked and helpless
– to maternal care. “His Majesty the Baby”, as
Freud (1914) saw, is afforded an exalted place
in the sun. In the next section, we now turn
to what happens when this exalted position
is not provided.

Living in the Shadows
In treating schizoid patients, Winnicott
is treating those individuals who, through
no fault of their own, were denied “the creative entry into life or of the initial creative
approach to external phenomena” (2005, p.
92). Winnicott discusses schizoid patients
all over his oeuvre. In “Ego Distortion in
Terms of True and False Self”, he recounts the
clinical case of a middle-aged woman “who
had the feeling all her life that she had not
started to exist, and that she had always been
looking for a means of getting to her ‘True

In a chapter titled “The Sick Soul” in his The varieties of religious experience, William James (1961) provides several examples of schizoid phenomena. The chapter is replete with clinical anecdotes, such as
the following: “I weep false tears, I have unreal hands: the things I see are not real things” (p .132). The
feeling of unreality – akin to depersonalization – is shared among many patients with schizoid dynamics.
A reader familiar with the DSM-V may wonder to what extent schizoid dynamics map on to current
nosology, including depersonalization/derealization disorder or Schizoid Personality Disorder (SPD). It is
beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to trace similarities and divergences. In any case, my sense
is that the description of SPD overemphasizes the patient’s putative “indifference” or “lack of interest” in
social connection, and hence overlooks the extent to which this apparent apathy is an organized defense
against terrifying impingement, overstimulation, or exposure to the other.

MIDDLE VOICES VOL. II

Self’”

(1965, p. 142).

Elsewhere, Winnicott
writes about a man who “felt unreal
and lost what little capacity he had had
for spontaneity” (p. 255). The same patient,
whose analysis is published in Holding and
Interpretation, comes to a poignant realization
in analysis one day: “I never became human. I
have missed it” (Winnicott, 1986, p. 96) 5. Though
this characterization may sound extreme, the
feeling of being less than human pervades
many accounts of schizoid patients. Taking
these accounts seriously, we are interested
in the question: what happens to the ethical relation when someone never becomes
human? Before approaching this question, we
must first ask: how is it that someone might
miss becoming human?
(2001)

In the previous section, I noted that in
healthy development, the infant is provided
with the illusion that reality is of its own creation. The mother affords her infant a mad
omnipotence. In these conditions, the infant
can live in happy naïveté, ignorant of its
absolute dependence. Unfortunately, some
infants are not permitted this normal madness. An infant’s continuity of being can be
disturbed by environmental impingements,
or in other words, failures of the environment
to actively adapt to its needs (Winnicott, 2001,
p. 247). Impingement from the environment
is the very meaning of trauma for Winnicott.
As a result of this impinging environment,
“there comes into existence an individual
that we call false because personal impulsiveness is missing” (p. 217). In this schizogenic
scenario, the infant does not act but reacts
to impingements, and as a result “there is
very little experience of impulses except
as reactions, and the Me is not established”

(p. 216).

Discovery of the environment does
not occur through self-initiated explorations
and impulses are not felt to come from the
self. Impulses are drained of life when they
become mere reactions to impingements.
Robbed of its primary love of life, the
infant risks falling back into the madness of
unintegration. In a defensive maneuver 6, the
infant develops a “false self” whose function
it is to hide and protect the “true self”: that
Me which is held in abeyance like a seed
without the proper nutrients to grow. Faced
with an environment that did not properly
hold the infant, it becomes the obligation of
the false, “caretaker” self to hold the infant
together and ensure that it does not fall to
pieces. Henceforth, its mode of being is devitalized compliance and a sense of futility in
all activity. 7
My sense is that Levinas understood
this threat of unintegration very well. In fact,
unintegration may very well be the place
of the Il y a. Consider the fact that Levinas
(1985) turned to his own childhood insomnia to elucidate the Il y a: “My reflection on
this subject starts with childhood memories.
One sleeps alone, the adults continue life;
the child feels the silence of their bedroom
as ‘rumbling’” (p. 48). I would like to take this
drama further in order to identify certain
resonances between Winnicott’s unintegration and Levinas’ Il y a. In this scenario,
the child left by their parents to sleep alone
begins to feel an eerie, encroaching silence –
a silence which is not simply negative, but is
more like a positive rumbling. Meanwhile,
there remains for the child some intimation
that life goes on beyond the bedroom walls:

6

Winnicott uses the term “disintegration” to designate this defensive maneuver. Disintegration is not so
much a disintegration at all, but a holding oneself tightly so as to ward off falling to pieces.

7

Winnicott (1991) elaborates: “Compliance carries with it a sense of futility for the individual and is associated with the idea that nothing matters and that life is not worth living” (p. 87).
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the adults continue life. Little Levinas has
insomnia. In insomnia, one is held to be in
“[…] an existence no longer in any way private” (Levinas, 2001). I believe this “lack of
privacy” opens up two directions of inquiry,
which reveal a similar ambiguity at the heart
of both the Il y a and unintegration.

cannot obliterate the other’s transcendence
(Levinas, 1969, p. 146). Upon this realization,
any one of us can be kept up at night by the
other. What is at stake here is the other as
real, and myself as real, as having been originally animated by the other and kept awake
by them.

On the one hand, the lack of privacy
ushered in by the Il y a refers to that eerie, positive nothingness through which the “subject”
is stripped of its autonomy and interiority.
On the other hand, lack of privacy suggests
a break-in of the other, as if in insomnia a
negative space has been carved out for the
other in this stripping-down or breaking-down of the subject. Hence the reality
that dawns on the child stricken with
insomnia: “the adults continue life”. Absent
from the room but continuing life, the very
separateness of their parents begin to dawn
on the child, perhaps for the first time. We
might say that in the Il y a there is exposure
to the other as real – real because absent,
real because separate and infinitely transcendent. In summary, this not-nothing
implies a certain ambiguity, since it implies
both an anonymous backdrop to existence,
but also the infinite, the transcendent other.
Like Macbeth, who knows that by suicide he
cannot take the whole world with him, the
child begins to sense that shutting their eyes

I believe we can now conceptualize
schizoid quasi-existence as a defensive position taken up with respect to the Il y a and the
infinite alterity of the other that it announces.
Just as soon as the idea of infinity dawns on
the subject can the defenses against infinity
be organized, which is to say, defenses against
the reality of the other.8 Thus it was perhaps
at this moment that young Levinas asked
his first philosophical question: Does the
other really continue to exist once I close my
eyes to the world? And the skeptic-schizoid
response, far away from ethics: maybe not.
No, I cannot be sure that they do. I cannot
be sure of the reality of any other. They slip
away from me, and I slip away from myself
when they are no longer holding me, when
the room begins to “rumble”, and I am threatened with unintegration.

8
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In a short section of Human Nature
under the heading “The philosophy of ‘real’”,
Winnicott (1988) remarks that the question
of reality plagues the schizoid patient. He saw

In taking up a pragmatic approach to question of the real, I have been influenced by the work of Megan
Craig (2010; 2016; 2017), who reads Levinas alongside William James to develop a pragmatic phenomenology. Craig (2016) writes: “James preferred the language of the real to any notion of truth, since the
sense of something being real entails a feeling of its animating ‘warmth’ or being alive. This meant that
philosophy for James was a practice of kindling a feeling of reality in others in order to bring things that
may have initially seemed mute or dead back to life” (p. 277). Similarly, Winnicott writes that the main
aim of therapy is not to know thyself, but to feel real: alive in one’s body. In prioritizing sensibility, Winnicott, Levinas, and James, share something like a philosophy of life.
For a study on hypertrophied intellectualism as a feature of schizoidism and modernism, see Louis Sass’
(1994) excellent monograph Madness and Modernism: Insanity in Light of Modern Art, Literature, and
Thought. Harvard University Press. Thinking more broadly, Winnicott’s positioning of intellect as a secondary defense resonates with Levinas’ critique of comprehension and rationality as totalizing endeavors
that are unlikely to lead us to the ethical relation. We could even say that Levinas project is to critique a
history of philosophy overly identified with the schizoid position, which to say, allergic to alterity.
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that the philosopher – a compulsive skeptic –
is more likely than others to be schizoid: “For
them the philosophical problem becomes
and remains a vital one, a matter of life and
death, of feeding or starvation, of love or
isolation” (p. 115). In his clinical experience,
he also found that the schizoid false self is
very often fortified by intellectualization
(1988, p. 144). The intellect can be “exploited
by an ill psyche” to serve as a compensatory
defensive organization for those who lack
vital contact with reality (p. 12).9 Infants who
suffer impingement can thus grow up to be
philosophical skeptics, constantly doubting
their own contact with external reality. Can
we consider Levinas’s childhood memory
as an example of impingement? We should
remember that impingement is not simply
about a suffocating intrusion, but also an
unbearable lacuna opened up between the
self and other who absents themself, leaving
me in the lurch. Such is the case when the
adults continue life, and there is good reason
to doubt that they will return in the morning.
The schizoid move is to retreat from the separateness of the other and in so doing refuse
to be tied to the other in the ethical relation.
The skeptic-schizoid position defends against
the other’s alterity.
The schizoid false self is not a separated
self by either Winnicott or Levinas’ definition, and so there is an impoverished ability
to participate in the economy of enjoyment
whereby they may live from the world’s nourishments. Only nourished from the self-same,
schizoid being is emaciated being. Schizoid
being is not properly a self at all, for there
is a lack of spontaneous action. According to
Levinas, “Action is […] the first manifestation
or the very constitution of an existent - a
someone that is” (Levinas, 2001, p. 23). Unable
to begin, unable to act, the schizoid patient
is nonetheless constantly engaged in holding
themself together. This is why Winnicott says
that “in the withdrawn state the patient is
holding the self” (Winnicott, 2001, p. 261). This

is a burden that costs them the ability to
risk life. They feel the weight of being most
heavily, are held to be, compliant, riveted or
chained to being, or I should say they chain
themselves to being; they must tie themselves
to being for fear of falling forever, as in
Maurice Blanchot’s Thomas the Obscure, cited
by Critchley (1993):
Just as the man who is hanging himself,
after kicking away the stool on which
he stood, the final shore, rather than
feeling the leap which he is making into
the void feels only the rope which holds
him, held to the end, held more than
ever, bound as he had never been before
to the existence he would like to leave.
His unfreedom is palpable. Unable to seek
escape in the world (for he lacks an separated
self), but threatened by the Il y a, he must
grip the rope tightly so as not to fall into
madness. Is not madness the other side of
the existent tightly tied to existence? To float
aimlessly, free from all coordinates, bound
to nothing and no one: a “free” being? The
schizoid defends against this madness just as
he defends against the other’s alterity. Even
suicide, Levinas and Winnicott both agree, is
never a genuine action, but a reaction to an
original falling from the primary love of life.
For Winnicott (1965) suicide may be a way
to protect the true self that has been locked
away (p. 143). Likewise, Levinas (1969) states
that in suicide “One flees life toward life” (p.
149). Not suicide, then, but some other solution is needed.

Ethics in the Breakdown
I have so far discussed how the schizoid patient
adopts a compliant, false self in response to
prior trauma, defined as “impingement from
the environment” (Winnicott, 2018, p. 198). In
denying subjection to the other, exposure to
absolute otherness, the schizoid patient has
also given up life: subjectivity itself. What
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results is a tenuous contact with reality –
including life’s nourishments – such that
the schizoid patient feels especially exposed
to the Il y a and must defend against it constantly. The false self vows never again to be
vulnerable to the other, never again to live
from their face or to be nourished by them.
Drichel (2019) elaborates:
What is important to recall in this
context is that this response-ability is
founded upon the very vulnerability
that the patient had hitherto defended
against, and that all the while remains
lodged in their unconscious as a conduit to the intimate relationality that is
“deeply longed for, yet warded off.” (p.
11)

Deeply longed for, yet warded off. This last
phrase speaks to what we could call the
patient’s ambivalence toward heteronomy.
My argument in this section will be that a
regression to unintegration – a breakdown
of the ego or a passage through madness 10
– is needed for the real subject to emerge, a
subject originally subjected to the other. If
there is something like an ethics of the face in
Winnicott it is to be found in the breakdown
of the ego. This would be the breakdown
that has thus far been refused by the schizoid
patient who has managed to hold themself
together at the cost of their vitality and the
ethical relation.
In his essay, “Fear of Breakdown”,
Winnicott (2018) defines “breakdown” as “the
unthinkable state of affairs that underlies
the defense organization” (p. 88). To fear a
breakdown, then, is to fear that one’s defense
organization will fail to protect against some
unthinkable state of affairs. Winnicott notes

from the outset the difficulty in studying the
breakdown, since clinical work is occupied
with the fear of breakdown, not the breakdown itself. For this reason, “what we see
clinically is always a defense organization
[against a breakdown]” (p. 90). Nonetheless,
Winnicott proposes the following thesis:
“I contend that clinical fear of breakdown
is the fear of breakdown that has already been
experienced” (p. 90). It is this primitive agony,
the original traumatism, which is defended
against at all cost from being repeated,
although this fact is hidden in the unconscious: “In this special context the unconscious means that the ego integration is not
able to encompass something” (p. 90-91). In
other words, something primordial remains
beyond grasp that is prior to thematizing
consciousness and breaks the encompassing,
encircling, comprehending movement of
consciousness. Thus Winnicott contradicts
himself on the next page by adding that the
breakdown that happened was not in fact
experienced, properly speaking. Something
has happened to the patient but the patient
was not there when it happened (p. 92). It is
yet to come and actually sought in the future.
The fear of breakdown therefore signifies, in
a Freudian fashion, a wish or longing to break
down. As much as it is feared, it contains a
kernel of hope: "The organization that makes
regression useful has this quality distinct
from the other defense organizations in that
it carries with it the hope of a new opportunity for an unfreezing …" (Winnicott, 2001). The
patient longs for regression, but wards it off.
It is a risk, but it is a necessary risk to take
for healing to be possible; what is needed
for healing is a regression to this original
dependency in which a primitive agony was
“experienced”.

10 Critchley (1999) suggests that address of the Other is the address of madness: Conscience devenue folle
(p. 232).
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The patient’s ambivalence (deeply longing, yet warding off) is intimately connected
to the ambiguity raised in the last section, in
which I noted that “lack of privacy” ushered
in by insomnia describes the depersonalization or breakdown of the “subject” but also
the break-in of the other. As vigilance without a subject (p. 62), insomnia marks the end
of privacy, but also the beginning of ethics.
Hence the allure of insomnia is the allure of
heteronomy: giving oneself over to the other.
Ambivalence toward this allure plays out
in the clinic; Winnicott saw time and again
how his patients fell asleep in those moments
when a breakdown was imminent. In this
way, we can see that withdrawal, which
Winnicott defines as detachment from a
waking relationship with external reality
(Winnicott, 2001, p. 255), is opposed to the ethical vigilance of insomnia.
Insomnia will be refused to the extent
that the patient fears they will be exposed to
a bad infinity. Rudi Visker (2004) elucidates
the ambiguity of infinity, associated with the
Il y a and ethical responsibility alike:
For responsibility is an impossibility-of-disappearing in which the subject
thus abides: here, too, there is infinity
(for responsibility is without end), but
then with a good liberating the subject,
rather than depleting it. Indeed, the
Good animates and inspires the subject,
and without the subject’s bending or
breaking under its breath, but holding
itself up. By singularizing me into an
irreplaceable I, the responsibility which
is thus ‘irrecusable’ distinguishes itself
from the ‘impossibility-to-disappear’ in
which there lies the terror of the Il y a
(p. 105).
As Visker shows, it is as if just when I am
about to be swallowed up in the impersonal
Il y a, I am suddenly saved by a Good infinity
that does not swallow me up in anonymity

but singularizes me, orders and ordains me,
all the while making it just as impossible for
me to disappear, fall asleep, or withdraw.
Hence we find in the breakdown of the ego
the original subjection to the other. This
subjection that constitutes subjectivity is
a traumatic subjection, as Levinas tells us,
and is a traumatic subjection that is hitherto
repudiated in schizoid “life”, but which must
be faced in deep regression that permits the
schizoid subject’s coming to be.
When everything is torn asunder, myself
included, I can only recover myself in the
Other, for whom I have made room. Levinas
(1998) writes of insomnia as the coring out
of the subject to make room for the other (p.
58-59). The moment of substitution (Ich bin
du, wenn ich ich bin) occurs in an absolute
regression marked by an infinite exposure. In
Winnicott’s (1965) own words,
I suggest that this I AM moment is a
raw moment; the new individual feels
infinitely exposed. Only if someone has
her arms around her infant at this time
can the I AM moment be endured, or
rather, perhaps risked (2006, p. 217-218).
As Levinas tells us, “Being is evil (mal) not
because it is finite but because it is without
limits” (p. 51). Boundless, a rumbling in the
child’s bedroom: the double infinity of the
rumbling apeiron and the parents’ transcendence. But the return of the parents, if the
infant permits their absence, can in turn
impose limits on this bad infinity. Alford
(2002) concludes his own study: “Could it be
that becoming the other’s hostage is a way to
escape the exposure of the “I AM”? After all,
Alford continues, “To be held hostage is still
being held.” (p. 51). In analysis, this infinite
exposedness I AM is met with Levinas’
infinite responsibility: HERE I AM (me voici)
(1985, p. 97).
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The Ethical Relation in Therapy
There is no doubt in Winnicott that healing
means moving toward spontaneity, creativity,
and the illusion of creating the world anew
at each moment. At face value this sounds
like an aggrandized narcissism – everything
that Levinas’ ethics calls into question. Yet,
Levinas is not proposing we be self-abnegating ascetic who must jump over need on their
way to desire. What schizoid phenomena
show us is that affective responsiveness and
ethical responsibility are intimate neighbors;
together they are compromised. In Otherwise
Than Being, Levinas insists that “[S]ensibility
can be a vulnerability, an exposedness to the
other or assaying only because it is an enjoyment” (Levinas, 1998, p. 74). He goes on further:
“Egoism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the
whole dimension of interiority – the articulations of separation – are necessary for the
idea of Infinity, the relation with the Other
which opens forth from the separated and
finite being” (Levinas, 1969, p. 148). As grave
as his philosophy appears, he also writes,
reminiscent of Winnicott, that “to live is to
play” (p. 134). Levinas calls for our ethical sensibility, where to sense is to be always already
exposed, vulnerable to being touched from
beyond my control. If to sense is to be always
exposed, then enjoyment, far from being
insulated, already always places us at a risk
of interruption.
In this paper, I have attempted to show
that the schizoid patient defends against the
terror of the Il y a and the terror of the face
alike: two infinities that are forsaken in their
insulated finitude. I have tried to explore the
schizoid patient’s ambivalence toward heteronomy. Exposed to this heteronomy from
the beginning, the human can be violated,
and in this case responds by foreclosing the
original traumatism from recurring. Such is
the schizoid patient’s compromise. It would
be an understatement to say the aim of therapy is for the schizoid patient to tolerate the

13

ambivalence of heteronomy; it is more like a
great risk, a leap of faith that needs to be ventured with blind confidence that “the Other
brings me a trauma which heals” (Visker, 2004,
p. 84) and not one that will annihilate me.
But perhaps we should think less in
terms of ethical disablement or impairment
of patients, and take this study to speak more
to the infinite demand of the other in the
longing for absolute dependence. In fact, to
say, as Marcus (2007) does, that the goal of
analysis is to help the analysand awaken to
moral life, strikes me as un-Levinasian, for
Levinas did say that the other’s responsibility is not my business. Should I not think
rather of my responsibility to the one who
never had their place in the sun? Winnicott
himself recognizes the extreme responsibility
of the therapist: “The danger does not lie in
the regression but in the analyst’s unreadiness
to meet the regression and the dependence
which belongs to it” (p. 261). This indeclinable responsibility that belongs to me alone,
uniquely me, is a responsibility that is not
exhausted when we offer our hands one time:
“The debt increases in the measure that it is
paid” (Levinas, 1998, p. 12). Perhaps the patient
is asking: Can you stand me awake and alive?
Or only while I am asleep and dead? Can you
stand my extreme dependence, or should I
remain in the shadow? These are not one time
questions. Ethics lies in openness: in the subject evermore broken open. Even Winnicott
recognized there is never a point at which the
human being has become conclusively integrated; integration is never more than provisional. At any moment trauma can break
open the ego once again, and the therapist
remains vigilant for such moments.
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